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Abstract
This paper examines whether the scale advantage of auditing ﬁrms can be used 
as an alternative indicator of audit quality when the evaluation of audit quality is 
costly. The adoption of asset impairment recognition in China has brought about 
a considerable impact on ﬁnancial reporting of Chinese listing companies in recent 
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years. This new accounting practice provided a special environment, which was 
subjected to less endogeneity problems than usual, to test the relationship between 
the scale of auditing business and audit quality. Prior research reported empirical 
evidence that both market value and ﬁrm characteristics are empirically related 
to  write-downs, reﬂected in the four dimensions return relevance, price relevance, 
persistence and determinant. Using these four dimensions, we investigated 
whether audit business scale advantage (ABSA) aﬀect audit quality of asset write-
downs. 
We contribute to the literature with the following findings. First, auditors’ 
business scale is positively related to return relevance of write-downs. Second, 
auditors with ABSA not only enhance the relevance between impairments and 
economic variables but also weaken the relation between impairments and 
managerial variables; however, the results appear in only a few of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc 
variables. Third, results are mixed when we test the ABSA eﬀect on price-relevance 
and persistence dimensions. Fourth, the ABSA effect is stronger when the 
complexity of asset write-downs requires some inside information to comprehend 
the nature of action. Adding to the main ﬁnding, we also found the ABSA eﬀect 
became weaker when we proxy ABSA with raw data of companies’ business 
scale instead of the top ﬁve auditors in business scale. Taken together, our results 
show that the ABSA eﬀect does exist in auditing of assets write-downs, although 
with weak evidence. Our results also indicated rational auditor choice based on 
quality of service in China’s audit market. We identiﬁed some unique factors from 
stakeholders’ cooperative structuring actions in China audit market as potential 
explanations to the market rationality.   
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Introduction
Researchers have increasingly paid attention to alternative indicators of audit 
quality in order. In searching for indicators of quality, audit business scale is easier 
to observe than speciﬁc audit adjustments. China has progressed in its accounting 
practice of asset impairment. Such an institutional setting oﬀered advantages in 
cross checking the suitability of using Audit Business Scale Advantage (ABSA) 
as a suitable indicator of audit quality. First, relative to the rapid development in 
accounting standards, the incumbent auditors generally remained stable. This test 
setting minimizes endogenous problems, which is common to auditing research. 
Second, it allows us to test audit quality in both economic and managerial 
dimensions.  Prior research suggested that asset write-downs are empirically related 
to several firm characteristics. Third, researchers can rely on rich data to test 
whether valuation implications of auditing quality exists when asset impairment 
accounting has exerted far-reaching influences on capital market reaction to 
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companies’ report earnings. Fourth, the disclosure of the majority part of write-
down information is mandated in China. This offered us a direct sample to 
identify the factors that may relate to the variation of an ABSA eﬀect across ﬁrms.  
Based on sample data of listed ﬁrms in China, we found that audit business 
scale is weakly related to auditing quality of assets write-downs. Although 
signiﬁcant results appear in only a few dimensions, they provide insights into the 
conditions of ABSA’s eﬀect in the Chinese audit market. The results also remind 
us to consider the positive eﬀect of cooperative constructing actions taken by all 
stakeholders in the audit market. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a 
theoretical analysis of ABSA eﬀect on the auditing quality of asset write-downs, 
including discussion of related literature in China’s institutional settings and 
the reasons why we focus on asset write-downs. The third section describes the 
research design including framework discussion, deﬁnition of variables, test models 
and data source, followed by a section where empirical results are analyzed. The 
ﬁnal section concludes the paper.
Analysis of Relationship between  
Audit Business Scale and Audit Quality 
Investigation of ABSA effect may have several significant implications. Most 
importantly, if ABSA could be used as a proxy of auditing quality, then the adverse 
selection problem due to the diﬃculty of observing audit quality will be reduced. 
Prior, research has developed many basic testable hypothesizes and theories in the 
process of seeking answers to auditing related questions. Lack of research in this 
area motivated us to ﬁnd evidence about whether an ABSA eﬀect exists in China’s 
audit market. Currently, the answer is far from clear, partly because predications of 
the extant theories are mixed, and also because the diﬀerent institutional settings 
reveal in more uncertainties and reduce the probability of observing an ABSA 
eﬀect.
1. Audit Theory and Audit Business Scale Eﬀect
DeAngelo (1981) posits that when clients provide auditors with quasi-rents, 
auditors are likely to engage opportunistic behavior. However, the more clients 
they have, the lower their motivation for opportunistic behaviors will be, as 
their potential  losses from such behavior tends to be much higher. Based on 
her theory, we would expect enhanced audit quality from auditors with business 
scale advantage. An alternative theory is that auditors with more wealth have 
higher risk to lose in litigation. Therefore, the audit service provided by wealthier 
auditors should carry higher quality (Dye 1993). Empirical evidence exists to 
support both theories. For example, the stock market reaction is more pronounced 
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when a company switches to a big auditor than to a small auditor (Eichenseher 
et al, 1989). Similarly, Teoh and Wong (1993) find that the earnings response 
coeﬃcients of companies hiring larger auditors are higher than that of the other 
companies. Moreover, large auditors standardize procedures in determining 
discretionary accruals and decrease chances of under-pricing in IPOs (Francis et al, 
1999; Balvers et al, 1988). However, the   relationship between audit business scale 
and audit quality may be confounded by several factors, such as the risk of clients 
mentioned by Bar-Yosef and Sarath (2005). If this is pervasive, it would hinder 
the likelihood of observing an ABSA eﬀect. In fact, DeFond et al (1999) ﬁnds that 
audit quality and market share may diverge into opposite directions.
2. Cooperative Constructing and the Basis of ABSA Eﬀect
Evidence that ABSA is positively related to audit quality, allows audit business scale 
to be used as an indicator of audit quality thereby reducing the cost of assessing 
quality. The following sections provide analysis of the basic conditions of an ABSA 
eﬀect in China’s audit market.
(1) Enhancement of Business Liquidity and Market Competition 
under the Reformed Auditing Regulation
China has progressed in improving business liquidity and market competition 
in audit market, given that liquidity and competition are two key conditions 
of an ABSA effect. First, the reformation and privatization of the entire audit 
industry was successfully completed. Second, audit firms voluntarily joined 
together to boost their scale following the advocacy of government policies. CPA 
ﬁrms expanded their business in diﬀerent ways, including establishing new ﬁrms 
after merging; absorbing another firm; establishing subsidiaries and recruiting 
professional employees. Under the new regulation, both the market liquidity and 
competition have been dramatically improved.
(2) Quasi-rent Eﬀect of Cooperative Regulating
Prior research suggests that regulators are capable of punishing opportunistic 
behavior and protecting investors in China’s capital market (Chen and Yuan 2004; 
Pistor and Xu 2005; Chen et al, 2008). Evidence was revealed in 2002, when ﬁve 
CPA ﬁrms were disqualiﬁed because of violation of industrial rules or suspicion of 
fraudulent business by market regulators (including Chinese Institute of Certiﬁed 
Public Accountants; Ministry of Finance People’s Republic of China and China 
securities regulatory commission)2. The penalty for this misconduct cost each 
dishonest auditor the closure of their entire audit business. Such a punishment 
2 See document Finance and Accounting No.[2002] 1031, title: “Answer to the opinions 
of annual inspection of auditors’ qualiﬁcation of auditing in China’s stock market”.
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scheme results in a higher cost and a bigger loss to a larger ﬁrm. Therefore, recent 
audit market regulation would promote an ABSA eﬀect.
(3) Establishment of Civil Litigation and Compensation System
Auditors may take audit business scale into consideration and issue reports 
cautiously, given that a loss from litigation is positively related with the wealth 
possessed by the company. On January 15th, 2002, the Supreme Court of the 
People’s Republic of China issued an interpretation on conditions under which 
companies can be sued by investors for their misleading financial statement in 
supporting the prosecution of such unethical behavior. The notice directed the 
implementation of legal procedures, and clariﬁed the deﬁnition of false statements 
and conditions of lawsuit and court jurisdiction on these cases. The notice 
enhanced legislative protection to investors, and deterred opportunistic auditors 
from freely violating the auditing rules.
3. Interference Factors of ABSA Eﬀect
Although supported by auditing policies and regulations, interference factors need 
to be noted which could make it hard to observe an ABSA eﬀect.  
First, the improvement of audit business liquidity may be affected by the 
rigidity of the original audit trading system. Moreover, we need more information 
besides local traﬃc conditions; arrangement of employees and eﬀective ﬁeld survey 
to evaluate the cost of business liquidity. It would be harder to observe an ABSA 
eﬀect when the system to determine liquidity cost becomes more complicated. 
Second, researchers may need to focus on the characteristics of the Chinese 
audit market since market concentration of China is lower compared to the 
United States. Evidence shows that an ABSA eﬀect is quite obvious when the top 
four auditors dominated the market. The evidence of an ABSA eﬀect may be hard 
to ﬁnd in China because the trajectory of market concentration is lower than that 
in the United States3.  
Third, the expansion of two audit ﬁrms may be diﬀerent even if their business 
scales are currency similar. Some large auditors expanded their business by mergers, 
while others rely on natural growth of their own business. Integration after merger 
has a great inﬂuence on the new auditor’s audit quality. For example, Wu(2006) 
shows whether the goal of business expansion can be fulﬁlled depends upon the 
integration and eﬃciency of resources allocated to auditors. Moreover, we may 
evaluate the eﬀect of business expansion after investigating the diﬀerence between 
management cultures, incentive eﬀect of new employees and the synergistic eﬀect 
of audit skills. It is diﬃcult to measure these factors’ so it is still unknown, whether 
audit business scale is correlated with audit quality.
3 We identify the top 10 auditors from the Top 100 Auditors for 2006 announced by 
CICPA and find that the total market share (calculated by annual revenue) of these 
largest auditors is lower than 60%.
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4. Asset Write-downs and Research Opportunity
To enhance communication between companies and investors without reducing 
the reliability of information, China carried out a series of development and 
reformation in the accounting area. Asset impairment accounting provides us with 
a research opportunity since it is an important accrual item of ﬁnancial report. 
Auditor switching is unlikely with regard to new standards of asset impairment, 
given that the cost of switching because of one accrual item. This research setting 
enables us to åcontrol the endogenous problem of research into audit quality.   
(1) Far-reaching Inﬂuence of Asset Write-downs on Financial Reports
Since 1998, accounting standards require China’s listed companies to recognize 
asset impairment for accounts receivable, inventories, and short and long-term 
investments. By 2001, the recognition of asset impairments was extended to cover 
four new categories: ﬁxed assets, constructions in progress, intangible assets, and 
commission loans. Since then, asset write-downs affect about 80% of the asset 
items and inﬂuence ﬁnancial reports extensively. To measure the depth of asset 
impairments’ inﬂuence on the ﬁnancial reports, we examined the median of write-
downs and found it was 15% of the absolute value of earnings before impairment 
provisions. The large magnitudes of write-downs demonstrated their importance. 
We find also that auditors emphasize that asset write-downs are important 
concerns mentioned in audit opinions over a period from 1998 to 2005. Table 1 
provides descriptive information about such audit opinions4.
Table 1: Audit Explanatory Paragraphs and Asset Write-downs
Panel A: Information about write-downs in audit explanatory paragraphs
No. of audit 
opinions 
in which 
information of 
write-downs are 
disclosed
The percentage 
of write-down 
opinions to 
all modiﬁed 
opinions of the 
same year
No. of audit 
opinions in 
which the 
amount of 
write-downs are 
disclosed
Total amount 
of asset write-
downs disclosed 
in modiﬁed 
opinions(billion) 
RM
1998 24 19.35% 9 0.89
1999 43 27.56% 24 1.82
2000 52 33.12% 34 3.70
2001 52 35.14% 31 3.05
2002 50 35.46% 37 0.71
2003 27 27.00% 20 2.90
4 There is subjectivity in our understanding of information of write-downs in audit 
opinion, so Table 1 is based on incomplete statistics. 
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No. of audit 
opinions 
in which 
information of 
write-downs are 
disclosed
The percentage 
of write-down 
opinions to 
all modiﬁed 
opinions of the 
same year
No. of audit 
opinions in 
which the 
amount of 
write-downs are 
disclosed
Total amount 
of asset write-
downs disclosed 
in modiﬁed 
opinions(billion) 
RM
2004 40 27.78% 35 6.11
2005 29 18.24% 28 7.14
Total 317 28.08% 218 26.32
Panel B: Categories of Write-down Information Disclosed in Audit Opinions
Reminding 
of large-
scale asset 
impairments
Large-
scale
reversals 
and
write-outs
compared 
to net 
income
Insuﬃcient 
evidence, 
diﬃcult to
judge
Accounting 
policies of 
asset write-
downs
Likely under-write-down
Present
zero- 
impairment 
items,
no 
comments
Present
zero- 
impairment 
items,  
diﬃcult to 
judge
Present
zero- 
impairment 
items,  
likely
under-
write-down
1998-2000
Frequency
Proportiona
40
24.84%
5
3.11%
49
30.43%
19
11.80%
10
6.21%
7
4.35%
31
19.25%
2001-2005
Frequency
Proportion
81
31.76%
6
2.35%
107
41.96%
29
11.37%
12
4.71%
5
1.96%
15
5.88%
Total
Frequency
Proportion
121
29.09%
11
2.64%
156
37.50%
48
11.54%
22
5.29%
12
2.88%
46
11.06%
a: Frequency of write-down event divided by number of total observations.
Panel A of table 1 shows that there are 317 modified opinions’ explanatory 
paragraphs concerning asset write-downs. These account for about 30% of all 
modified opinions from 1998-2005. Meanwhile, auditors raised doubts on about 
25 billion RM of asset impairments in 218 audit opinions. Panel B shows several 
categories of opinions of write-downs. The total number of observations in Panel B is 
higher than that in Panel A because one company can receive many opinions of write-
downs. The opinions title ‘It is hard to determine whether assets write-downs are 
fair because there is insuﬃcient evidence’ account for more than one third of all the 
observations, and demonstrate the opportunity for manipulation in asset impairments. 
Accounting for about 30% of all opinions, this type of opinion was widely used 
by auditors to draw attention to large-scale asset impairments. Moreover, there is 
evidence suggesting the diﬃculty of auditing long lived assets, i.e. we have noticed the 
proportion of both these two types of opinions to have increased after 2001, when the 
new four items of assets were added into asset impairment accounting.
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(2) Empirical Relationship between Asset Write-downs and Corporate 
Market Value
An important reason for considering the value relevance of asset write-downs is 
that companies may measure impairments of assets and communicate private 
information by asset write-downs. Based on a sample of China listed ﬁrms that 
adopted write-downs, Yang et al (2005) ﬁnd that asset write-downs are positively 
related to companies’ annual buy-and-hold returns from 1999-2001. Alciatore et 
al (2000) ﬁnd similar evidence from the U.S. petroleum industry, with the market 
anticipating asset impairments before losses are recognized. Based on Zhang (2005) 
and Zhou and Lu (2007)’s research design and the empirical relationship between 
asset write-downs and corporate market value, researchers can test whether value 
relevance of asset write-downs become stronger when being audited by auditors 
with business scale advantage. 
(3) Empirical Relation between Assets Write-downs and Firm 
Characteristics
Researchers have concentrated on the determinants of asset write-downs. 
Wilson (1996) suggests the manipulated component of accounting accruals is 
involved. Both the asset impairment hypothesis and opportunistic hypothesis 
have supporting evidence from the extant literature. In terms of the asset 
impairment hypothesis, some literature shows that asset write-downs are related 
to changes in the underlying economics (Francis et al 1996; Li 2001; Riedl 2004). 
Moreover, management can communicate their private information about future 
performance and transfer operating burden to outside stakeholders (Strong and 
Meyer 1987; Francis et al 1996; Frantz 1999; Chen et al 2004). The opportunistic 
hypothesis states that companies may recognize asset impairments to achieve 
report incentives, including meeting the compensation plan, smoothing earnings, 
showing management’s abilities in improving performance  and meeting regulatory 
requirements (Zucca and Campbell 1992; Elliott and Shaw 1988; Francis et al, 
1996; Riedl 2004; Li 2001; Cai and Zhang 2004). In our test period, about 90% 
percent of China’s listed ﬁrms recognized asset impairments. Therefore, in addition 
to evaluating the auditor’s professional expertise dimension of audit quality from 
the relation between asset write-downs and economic realities, but we can also test 
the auditor independence dimension of auditor quality through the correlation 
between asset impairment and report incentives. 
5. Possible Contributions of Research
This research contributes to the accounting literatures about China in three ways. 
First, more evidence of an ABSA eﬀect is helpful because extant research results 
has mixed prediction in general. We can simultaneously observe ABSA eﬀect in 
write-downs’ value relevance, persistence and discretion, given that China has 
developed its asset impairment accounting. Second, the disclosure of write-downs 
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in China is both detailed and systematic. Such an institutional setting allows us 
to test the ABSA eﬀect in a big sample and provides us with an opportunity to 
explore relevant factors connected to it. Third, the results may help us understand 
the forces that strengthen or weaken the ABSA eﬀect in China’s audit market.
Research Methodology
1. Test Mechanism and Dimensions of ABSA Eﬀect
According to information value relevance, companies may recognize that asset 
impairments communicates private information about asset values and decreasing 
future cash flows. Prior research has shown that write-downs are related to 
corporate market value (Yang et al, 2005; Alciatore et al, 2000). Auditing with 
high quality will be detected by the capital market, and the value relevance of 
write-downs will be improved when there is information asymmetry. The higher 
is the audit business scale, the more valuable information the write-downs 
convey if the ABSA eﬀect does exist. Applying the value-relevance models to this 
circumstance, the association between write-downs and corporate market value 
will increase when audit business scale increases. If testing in determinant models, 
we should observe a stronger association between write-downs and economic 
factors, and a weaker association between write-downs and report incentives as 
audit business scale increases. 
The ABSA effect will be tested in two ways. In the interaction test, the 
interaction between audit business scale and write-downs will be examined. In 
the group test, all of the sample will be divided into two groups by audit business 
scale, and the multiple of write-downs in the advantage group will be compared 
to that in the common group. We will present results of both of these two test 
solutions as each test has its own advantages and disadvantages.
The ABSA effect will be tested in four dimensions. First, the association 
between audit business scale and return relevance of write-downs will be 
investigated. Since auditing is beneficial to the improvement of information 
relevance as well as the protection of information reliability, the return relevance 
of the item being audited reﬂects audit quality. This logic is the fundamental basis 
underlying the validity of our tests. The second test dimension is price relevance 
which focuses on the ﬁrm value derived from accounting information. The price 
relevance model provides additional information to the return relevance model as 
the beginning price signiﬁcantly inﬂuences how investors predict future earnings 
(Kothari and Zimmerman 1995; Barth et al, 2001). Third, we focus on the 
ABSA effect in persistence of write-downs. The discretionary portion of write-
downs could reduce the relationship of write-downs and ex post realization. In 
the persistence dimension, whether auditor scale aﬀects the association between 
write-downs and ex post earnings will be tested. Finally, we investigate the ABSA 
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eﬀect on the reporting incentives from two aspects. One is whether audit business 
scale helps to improve the explanatory power of economic factors to write-downs, 
the other is whether audit business scale curbs managerial reporting incentives to 
write-downs.
Although each test focuses on diﬀerent relationships, the four test dimensions 
are interrelated. Return relevance and price relevance focus on the interaction 
among auditors, management and information users. The other two dimensions 
cover interaction between auditors and management. Therefore, results of the last 
two dimensions directly aﬀect the results of the ﬁrst two dimensions. In terms 
of return relevance and price relevance, the tests focus on perceived audit quality 
of write-downs, and in terms of persistence and determinant, the tests focus on 
audit quality in write-downs’ ex post realization and fairness. Since the test of 
each dimension provides additional results to complement other dimensions, the 
results help us understand the strength of the ABSA eﬀect. The concordance of 
realization, fairness and impairment judgment improve perceived audit quality of 
write-downs. Therefore, the robustness of the ﬁndings relies on the consistency of 
results of all  four tests.
2. Proxies for Audit Business Scale Advantage
How the ABSA variables are designed is important since the main research purpose 
is to test the ABSA eﬀect in auditing write-downs. In this research, ABSA will be 
designed in various ways to minimize noise since markets perceive ABSA based on 
all publicly available information. 
First, we rank auditors by number of clients and classify them into the Top 
5 group and the Common group. Similarly, we rank the top 5 and non top 5 
group according to the audit revenue or total assets of clients, SC is a dummy 
variable with a value of 1 if a company hires an auditor in the Top 5 group, and 
0 otherwise5. When dummy variables are used as indicators of ABSA, our models 
focus on testing advantage of several top auditors. Such a classiﬁcation method 
was inspired by the long tail theory which presents that several hot products 
with famous brands dominate the market while the total share of all the other 
products are low (Anderson 2006). It seems that this eﬀect exists too in the audit 
market. Additional beneﬁts of using dummy variable SC is that we can partition 
5 We employ top 5 instead of other numbers due to two reasons. First, using a small 
number of ranking auditors may reduce the inﬂuence of auditors’ making noise to the 
research results. Second, we ﬁnd that the number of  6th auditor’s clients equal to the 
number of the 7th auditor’s in 2001;  the number of  8th auditor’s clients equal to the 
number of the 9th auditor’s in 2002; the number of 10th auditor’s clients equal to the 
number of the 11th auditor’s in 2002. The top 5 is therefore suitable level in such a 
situation.
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the samples into two groups and then compare the multiples of write-downs of 
each. Our comparison tests are less likely to suﬀer from multicollinearity that was 
common in interaction tests. The disadvantage of using this dummy variable is 
that we may lose some information about audit business scale. 
Second, for sensitivity tests, we rank auditors into ﬁve groups and use group 
numbers as indicators of ABSA. We also use the raw data of audit business scale to 
re-test our models. The groups SC range from 0-4 and group 0 is the top group. 
Considering the problem of heterodesiticity, we employ the natural logarithm of 
audit revenue and the total asset of the clients.
Third, to overcome concerns about accuracy of perceived cost of audit business 
scale, we separate the samples into three groups according to the Top 100 auditors 
disclosed by the Chinese Institute of Certiﬁed Public Accountants.  Joint Venture 
Advantage group covers auditors established by Big 4 international CPA firms 
and local CPA firms. Local advantage group consists of auditors that meet 3 
conditions: First, the auditor is included in the list of Top 100 auditors disclosed 
by the CICPA. Second, both audit revenue and number of CPA of the auditors 
are in the Top 20. Third, the auditors are not covered by Joint Venture advantage 
group6. Both Joint Venture Advantage group and Local advantage group are 
compared to Local Common group composed of local auditors without ABSA. 
To measure the market share of auditors, we mark auditor code by the names of 
auditors disclosed by Wind Database. The marking of auditor code is based on 3 
rules. First, when one auditor appears with similar names or has changed name, 
all such observations are marked as one auditor code. Second, when auditor A 
with the qualiﬁcation of auditing of listed ﬁrms merged with auditor B without 
qualiﬁcation of auditing of listed ﬁrms, the new auditor’s code takes that of auditor 
A. Third, if both of the merged auditors with qualiﬁcation of auditing of listed 
ﬁrms, then the new condition is given a new code. 
3. Research Models
Since China’s listed ﬁrms disclosed detailed information of asset write-downs in 
their annual reports, the association study method is used to test ABSA eﬀect in 
value relevance of write-downs. As suggested by Kothari and Zimmerman (1995), 
a return model is used to test whether audit business scale aﬀect the association of 
write-downs with the change in stock value over a year. We also use a price model 
to test whether audit business scale aﬀects the relation between write-downs and 
the ending market value of a company over a year. Return and price models are 
6 The ﬁrst year of Top 100 information disclosed by the CICPA on the internet is 2002. 
Therefore, the information of 2002 is a proxy for that of the 2001. Both total revenue 
and number of CPA are disclosed in Top 100 information. These two criterions are 
simultaneously used to identify audit business scale advantage. 
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based on literature that not only provides basic models but also support the value 
relevance of earnings (including write-downs) in China’s stock market (Easton and 
Harris 1991; Easton et al, 1993; Ohlson 1995; Eccher and Healy 2000; Chen et 
al, 2001;  Chen and Wang 2004; Yang et al, 2005).
(1) Return Relevance Model:
RETURN = + 1FWPSP_O + 2FWPSP_B + 3WPSP + 4SIZE + 5SC + 6SC WPSP +
(2) Price Relevance Model:
PRICE = + 1FWPS_O + 2FWPS_B + 3WPS + 4SIZE + 5BVPS 6SC + 7SC WPS +
     Based on literature that concentrates on earnings persistence (Sloan 1996; 
Richardson et al, 2005), a persistence model is employed to test whether audit 
business scale aﬀects write-downs and earnings of the next year.
(3) Persistence Model:
FUPER = + 1OITA + 2BITA + 3WITA + 4SC + 5SC WITA +
RETURN is an annual buy-and-hold return using the month of official 
ﬁnancial statements publication in China as the ending month of the calculation 
period7. We calculate RETURN by the following formula:
 
RETURN = (1 + monthly returns with cash ﬂow dividends reinvested)
FWPSP_O, FWPSP_B, and WPSP represent three earnings components. 
FWPSP_O is recurring income (before write-downs) per share divided by the 
beginning stock price and FRPSP_B is nonrecurring income (before write-downs) 
per share divided by the beginning stock price8. WPSP is the amount of write-
downs per share divided by the beginning stock price9. The value of write-downs 
is positive in the incentive model but negative in all other models. Therefore, in 
both value relevance and persistence models, a signiﬁcantly positive ß3 suggests the 
usefulness of the write-downs information as perceived by investors. SIZE is the 
7 April is the oﬃcial month of ﬁnancial statement publication of China. The end of April 
is also the end of our research year. The end of the last April is the beginning of the 
research year.
8 Recurring income before write-downs=operating income-other income+bad debt 
provisions+inventory impairments. Nonrecurring income before write-downs=net 
income-operating income+write-downs. 
9 We may slightly overestimate the amount of impairment recognized by companies since 
we use the data from asset write-down tables as proxy for write-downs. 
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natural logarithm of total assets. The price model includes the ending stock price 
P, the three earnings components per share, namely FRPS_O, FRPS_B, and RPS, 
and net asset per share BVPS. The deﬁnitions of the three earnings components 
are the same as those in the return model. FUPER is net income of period 
t+1 divided by beginning total asset. OITA, BITA, and WITA are respectively 
recurring income before write-downs, nonrecurring income before write-downs 
and write-downs in period t. All three variables are divided by beginning total 
asset. In all three models, we include three year dummies to control for stock 
market ﬂuctuations. SC is audit business scale advantage measured by the proxies 
introduced in section 3.2. A significantly positive interaction term of SC and 
write-downs suggests that an ABSA eﬀect does exist.
Our last model is based on literature that focus is on determinants of asset 
write-downs (Francis et al. 1996; Li 2001; Riedl 2004).
(4) Determinants of asset write-downs:
WDTA = + 1INDROA + 2INDGROW + 3INDMTA + 4SALE + 5OCF + 6MTA 
+ 7MI + 9ST + 10AVST + 11MGT + 12DEC + 13INC + 14LEV + 15SIZE 
+ 16SC + 17SC SALE + 18SC OCF + 19SC MTA + 20SC MI + 21SC ST 
+ 22SC AVST + 22SC MGT + 23SC DEC + 24SC INC +
WDTA is the amount of write-downs divided by the beginning total assets. 
Economic factors measure the status of the underlying economics. INDROA, 
INDGROW, and INDMTA capture the prospect of the industries; they represent 
median changes from period t-1 to period t in industry returns on assets, growth 
of sales, and market value divided by book value of total assets10. ΔSALE, ΔOCF, 
ΔMTA, and ΔMI are four economic factors to measure ﬁrm-speciﬁc changes in 
asset value. They represent sales growth, growth of market value divided by total 
assets, and changes in operating cash flows and main operating income from 
period t-1 to period t divided by the beginning total assets11. We expect ß1 to ß7 
to be signiﬁcantly negative as write-downs reﬂect asset value impairments.
In terms of report variables, ST is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a company 
carries a “special treatment” symbol due to its reporting losses for two consecutive 
10 We use market value divided by book value of total assets instead of market to book ratio 
because some companies’ net assets are negative.
11 We cannot calculate operating income before write-downs in 2001 without 
overestimation because write-downs in 2000 are not available. Therefore, we use changes 
in main operating income instead of operating income.
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years, and 0 otherwise12. AVST is also a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a 
company recognizes a loss for the ﬁrst time in period t, and 0 otherwise. Both ST 
and AVST companies will incur higher capital cost if their reported earnings are 
still negative in the next year.  MGT is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a ﬁrm has 
a new board chairman or chief executive officer from an external source. Prior 
literature suggests that the incoming outside top management tend to write down 
assets to clear an immediate burden and to there by increase the likelihood of 
future performance improvement (Strong and Meyer 1987; Francis et al 1996). 
DEC equals the absolute value of pre-write-down earnings decline divided by 
beginning total assets, when the decline amount is higher than the median of 
decline amount of industry, and 0 otherwise. INC equals the change of pre-write-
down earnings amount divided by beginning total assets, when the change amount 
is higher than the median of positive values of industry, and 0 otherwise. Both 
DEC and INC companies tend to write down so as to enhance market value (Riedl 
2004). As control variables for capturing other factors that might also explain the 
variation, LEV is debt to asset ratio and SIZE is the natural logarithm of ending 
total assets. We also include three year dummies and 18 industry dummies to 
control for diﬀerences of observations.
4. Sample and Data Source
After deleting observations of the finance industry, there are 4569 firm-year 
observations with write-down and ﬁnancial data from 2001 to 2004. Observations 
are deleted if the auditor’s name or if the audit fees cannot be identified13. 
Observations with negative impairment are also deleted. We there by obtain 
4223 study observations. Finally, after deleting observations with missing data 
for research variables, we obtained 3853 clean observations, of which 88 do not 
recognize write-downs. The sample distribution of frequency by observing years is 
698, 966, 1056 and 1133, respectively for each of the four years.  
Research data are selected from the Wind database, including the amount of 
write-downs, audit fee, name of auditor and ﬁnancial data. We obtain monthly 
12 Starting from 1 January 2002, the listed companies report two consecutive years of loss 
are marked with an “ST” symbol. ST companies are required to submit audited semi-
annual report to the regulators. Moreover, ST companies also face trading restrictions, 
such as a daily price ﬂuctuation of no more than 5 percent, which is 5 percent lower 
than the price ﬂuctuation allowed for normal companies. If the ST companies report a 
negative earnings in the third year, their “ST” symbols will be change to “*ST” symbols 
and they are forbidden from trading temporarily. Finally, if the *ST companies loss again 
in the following quarter, they will be delisted.
13 Since 2001, China’s listed ﬁrms are required to disclose their audit fee. If all clients’ audit 
fees are missing in the same year, then the auditor and his clients will not appear in our 
test. Some observations were deleted accordingly.
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returns with cash ﬂow dividends reinvested and stock prices from the CSMAR 
database. To avoid outlier eﬀects, we winsorize all continuous variables by year 
at the minimum and maximum 1 percent levels and present the outlier-adjusted 
descriptive statistics of all variables in Table 2.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Sample Standard 
deviation
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
WDTA 3853 0.028 0.013 0.005 0.000 0.228 
INDROA 3853 0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.027 0.021 
INDGROW 3853 0.077 0.173 0.162 -0.068 0.469 
INDBTA 3853 0.066 -0.258 -0.266 -0.419 0.077 
ΔSALE 3853 0.592 0.253 0.163 -0.773 5.194 
ΔOCF 3853 0.105 0.008 0.008 -0.376 0.423 
ΔMTA 3853 0.223 -0.230 -0.261 -0.718 0.659 
ΔMI 3853 0.047 0.018 0.012 -0.109 0.239 
ST 3853 0.196 0.040 0.000 0.000 1.000 
AVST 3853 0.290 0.093 0.000 0.000 1.000 
MGT 3853 0.348 0.141 0.000 0.000 1.000 
DEC 3853 0.025 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.173 
INC 3853 0.050 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.373 
LEV 3853 0.207 0.485 0.482 0.072 1.881 
SIZE 3853 0.881 21.139 21.071 19.048 23.955 
RETURN 3853 0.234 -0.212 -0.235 -0.761 0.647 
PRICE 3853 4.218 8.119 7.250 1.410 25.570 
FWPSP_O 3853 0.033 0.020 0.016 -0.100 0.149 
FWPSP_B 3853 0.016 -0.004 -0.002 -0.087 0.063 
FWPS_O 3853 0.318 0.219 0.173 -0.657 1.474 
FWPS_B 3853 0.145 -0.036 -0.022 -0.716 0.489 
BVPS 3853 1.490 2.995 2.852 -2.194 8.080 
WPSP 3853 0.020 -0.008 -0.002 -0.199 0.000 
WPS 3853 0.148 -0.068 -0.024 -1.292 0.000 
FUPER 3853 0.075 0.014 0.021 -0.379 0.200 
OITA 3853 0.058 0.040 0.035 -0.130 0.274 
BITA 3853 0.028 -0.006 -0.005 -0.126 0.121 
WDTA: amount of write-downs over beginning total assets; INDROA: median annual change in 
industry returns on assets; INDGROW: median annual change in industry sales growth; INDMTA: 
median change in corporate market value over total assets of industry; ΔSALE: sales growth; ΔOCF: 
annual change in operating cash ﬂow divided by beginning total assets; ΔMTA: growth of corporate 
market value over total assets; ΔMI: annual change in main operating income divided by beginning 
total assets; ST: equal to 1 if a ﬁrm is titled with “ST” because of reporting losses for two consecutive 
years, and 0 otherwise; AVST: equal to 1 if a ﬁrm suﬀers a loss for the ﬁrst time, and 0 otherwise; 
MGT: coded 1 if there is a new chairman of boards or CEO coming from an external source, and 
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0 otherwise; DEC: equal to annual change in earnings before write-downs if this change is lower 
than median of negative changes in industry; and otherwise; INC: equal to annual change in 
earnings before write-downs if this change is higher than median of positive changes in industry; 
LEV: debt to asset ratio; SIZE: the natural logarithm of ending total assets; RETURN: annual buy-
and-hold return using the oﬃcial month of ﬁnancial statements publication in China as the ending 
month of calculation period; PRICE: closing stock price on the last trading day of the oﬃcial month 
of ﬁnancial statements publication in China; FWPSP_O: pre-write-down operating income per 
share divided by beginning stock price; FWPSP_B: pre-write-down non-operating income per share 
divided by beginning stock price; FWPS_O: pre-write-down operating income per share; FWPS_B: 
pre-write-down non-operating income per share; BVPS: net assets per share; WPSP: write-downs per 
share divided by beginning stock price; negative; WPS: write-downs per share, negative; FUPER: 
net income of period t+1 divided by total assets of period t; OITA: pre-write-down operating income 
divided by beginning total assets; BITA: pre-write-down non-operating income divided by beginning 
total assets.
Even after being winsorized, the mean value of write-downs divided by 
beginning total assets is still larger than 1%, and the median value is about 0.5%. 
The magnitude of asset write-downs is lower than the restructure charge of listed 
ﬁrms in the United States. However, the far-reaching inﬂuence of write-downs on 
ﬁnancial reports cannot be neglected.
Table 3 presents correlations for variables.
Table 3: Correlations for Main Research Variables
Panel A: Variables in models of information’s usefulness
RETURN PRICE FUPER WPSP WPS WDTA
RETURN 0.53 0.39 0.21 0.18 -0.19
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PRICE 0.56 0.30 0.22 0.10 -0.14
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
FUPER 0.42 0.39 0.29 0.27 -0.27
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
WPSP 0.15 0.27 0.26 0.93 -0.87
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
WPS 0.13 0.05 0.20 0.95 -0.89
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
WDTA -0.15 -0.08 -0.19 -0.91 -0.94
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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Panel B: Variables in models of write-downs’ determinants
WDTA ΔSALE ΔOCF ΔMTA ΔMI ST AVST MGT DEC INC
WDTA -0.05 -0.04 0.11 -0.09 0.43 0.34 0.06 0.34 0.20
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ΔSALE -0.07 0.16 -0.07 0.57 -0.11 -0.15 0.00 -0.18 0.18
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.90) (0.00) (0.00)
ΔOCF -0.05 0.15 0.07 0.20 0.02 -0.11 0.01 -0.14 0.16
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (023) (0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.00)
ΔMTA 0.03 -0.05 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.12
(0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.36) (0.00)
ΔMI -0.04 0.68 0.18 0.06 -0.11 -0.29 -0.02 -0.35 0.31
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00)
ST 0.26 -0.16 0.02 0.05 -0.13 -0.07 0.09 0.07 0.17
(0.00) (0.00) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
AVST 0.30 -0.23 -0.12 0.01 -0.32 -0.07 0.05 0.66 -0.12
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.41) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MGT 0.06 -0.07 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.10
(0.00) (0.00) (0.41) (0.67) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DEC 0.16 -0.32 -0.14 -0.05 -0.45 0.06 0.62 0.06 -0.14
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
INC 0.22 0.23 0.16 0.15 0.43 0.12 -0.20 0.06 -0.30
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Panel C: Correlations between audit business scale and write-downs
NUMBER SCALE FEE WPSP WPS WDTA
NUMBER 0.35 0.76 -0.02 -0.02 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.19) (0.35) (0.58)
SCALE 0.74 0.65 0.01 0.02 -0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.64) (0.25) (0.23)
FEE 0.82 0.82 0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.44) (0.74) (0.38)
WPSP -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.93 -0.87
(0.05) (0.00) (0.66) (0.00) (0.00)
WPS -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.95 -0.89
(0.02) (0.06) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)
WDTA 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.91 -0.94
(0.05) (0.47) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00)
NUMBER: number of audit clients; SCALE: total assets of audit clients; FEE: audit fee; all other 
variables are as deﬁned in table 2; the top half of tables present Pearson correlations and the bottom 
half present Spearman correlations for the variables.
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Panel A of table 3 shows correlations for the main independent variables in 
models testing usefulness of write-down information. The association between 
write-downs and value indicators such as return, price and net income in period 
t+1 suggests  that information about asset impairments are useful. Panel B presents 
correlations for variables in determinant models. It is obvious that write-downs 
are related to the majority of the incentive variables; however, the relation between 
write-downs and economic factors is weaker than that of the report incentive 
variables. Panel C presents a weak relationship between audit business scale and 
write-downs. Potentially the result could be masked by the multicollinearity 
problem induced by an interaction between write-downs and audit business scale.
Empirical Results
Table 4 presents results of ﬁve return relevance models in which SC are dummy 
variables. In the ﬁrst three models, audit business scale is identiﬁed by number of 
clients, total assets of clients and audit fees respectively. The fourth model tests for 
an ABSA eﬀect between local advantage samples and local common samples. The 
5th model tests for an ABSA eﬀect between joint venture group advantage group 
and local common group. Table 5 to Table 7 employ the same tests as Table 4 with 
diﬀerent dependent variables, including ending price, net income in period t+1 
and write-downs divided by beginning total assets. We focus on the interaction 
eﬀects between audit business scale advantage and write-downs, and report White-
corrected p-value in the tables.
Table 4: Audit Business Advantage and Return Relevance of Asset Write-downs
Criteria 
of ABSA
Number of 
clients
Total assets of 
clients
Audit fees
Local 
advantage 
VS
Local common
Joint venture 
advantage
VS
Local common
Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value
Intercept -0.71 0.00 -0.70 0.00 -0.71 0.00 -0.66 0.00 -1.26 0.00 
FWPSP_O 2.98 0.00 2.97 0.00 2.97 0.00 2.93 0.00 2.33 0.00 
FWPSP_B 1.63 0.00 1.59 0.00 1.61 0.00 1.58 0.00 1.61 0.00 
WPSP 0.07 0.72 0.12 0.48 0.09 0.59 0.09 0.60 0.27 0.21 
SIZE 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 
SC 0.00 0.56 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.35 0.02 0.39 
SC×WPSP 0.72 0.02 0.92 0.03 0.97 0.01 0.93 0.01 1.21 0.37 
YEAR02 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.86 0.03 0.09 
YEAR03 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.11 0.00 
YEAR04 -0.20 0.00 -0.20 0.00 -0.20 0.00 -0.20 0.00 -0.20 0.00 
N 3853 3853 3853 3572 1046
Adj R2 0.3849 0.3852 0.3851 0.3776 0.4189
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Criteria 
of ABSA
Number of 
clients
Total assets of 
clients
Audit fees
Local 
advantage 
VS
Local common
Joint venture 
advantage
VS
Local common
Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value
F value 268.83*** 269.17*** 269.07*** 241.74*** 84.70***
SC: coded 1if a ﬁrm hires an auditor with audit business scale advantage, and 0 otherwise; all other 
variables are as deﬁned in table 2. 
Table 5: Audit Business Advantage and Price Relevance of Asset Write-downs
Criteria 
of ABSA
Number of 
clients
Total assets of 
clients
Audit fees
Local 
advantage 
VS
Local common
Joint venture 
advantage
VS
Local common
Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value
Intercept 34.96 0.00 35.74 0.00 35.87 0.00 37.08 0.00 23.15 0.00 
FWPS_O 6.38 0.00 6.38 0.00 6.32 0.00 6.22 0.00 6.12 0.00 
FWPS_B 4.42 0.00 4.42 0.00 4.30 0.00 4.02 0.00 3.96 0.00 
BVPS 0.63 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.41 0.00 
WPS -2.23 0.00 -2.16 0.00 -2.03 0.00 -1.99 0.00 -1.79 0.00 
SIZE -1.25 0.00 -1.29 0.00 -1.30 0.00 -1.35 0.00 -0.70 0.00 
SC 0.52 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.53 0.00 1.08 0.00 
SC×WPS 1.23 0.10 1.43 0.14 0.37 0.68 0.47 0.53 6.54 0.02 
YEAR02 -2.58 0.00 -2.60 0.00 -2.61 0.00 -2.66 0.00 -2.10 0.00 
YEAR03 -3.77 0.00 -3.77 0.00 -3.79 0.00 -3.91 0.00 -3.15 0.00 
YEAR04 -6.91 0.00 -6.90 0.00 -6.92 0.00 -7.07 0.00 -6.17 0.00 
N 3853 3853 3853 3572 1046
Adj R2 0.5762 0.5771 0.5793 0.5835 0.5041
F value 524.76*** 526.66*** 531.51*** 501.23*** 107.22***
SC: coded 1if a ﬁrm hires an auditor with audit business scale advantage, and 0 otherwise; all other 
variables are as deﬁned in table 2.
Table 6: Audit Business Advantage and Persistence of Asset Write-downs
Criteria 
of ABSA
Number of 
clients
Total assets of 
clients
Audit fees
Local 
advantage 
VS
Local common
Joint venture 
advantage
VS
Local common
Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value
Intercept -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 
OITA 0.77 0.00 0.77 0.00 0.77 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.83 0.00 
BITA 0.39 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.00 
WITA 0.19 0.02 0.19 0.02 0.20 0.01 0.19 0.02 0.34 0.01 
SC 0.00 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
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Criteria 
of ABSA
Number of 
clients
Total assets of 
clients
Audit fees
Local 
advantage 
VS
Local common
Joint venture 
advantage
VS
Local common
Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value
SC×WITA 0.18 0.36 0.42 0.10 0.26 0.29 0.53 0.06 -0.19 0.65 
N 3853 3853 3853 3572 1046
Adj R2 0.3442 0.3458 0.3450 0.3356 0.3522
F value 253.68*** 255.56*** 254.65*** 226.47*** 72.01***
Year dummies are included; SC: coded 1if a firm hires an auditor with audit business scale 
advantage, and 0 otherwise; all other variables are as deﬁned in table 2.
Table 7: Audit Business Advantage and Determinants of Asset Impairments
Criteria 
of ABSA Number of 
clients
Total assets of 
clients
Audit fees
Local 
advantage 
VS
Local common
Joint venture 
advantage
VS
Local common
Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value
Intercept 0.0359 0.00 0.0369 0.00 0.0403 0.00 0.0474 0.00 0.0956 0.00 
INDROA -0.1426 0.31 -0.1321 0.35 -0.1073 0.45 -0.1298 0.39 -0.1836 0.55 
INDGROW 0.0065 0.39 0.0045 0.56 0.0024 0.76 0.0031 0.70 -0.0128 0.42 
INDBTA 0.0021 0.77 0.0015 0.83 0.0008 0.90 0.0002 0.98 0.0013 0.92 
ΔSALE 0.0000 0.98 0.0015 0.24 0.0003 0.79 0.0002 0.88 0.0010 0.74 
ΔOCF -0.0091 0.05 -0.0084 0.06 -0.0101 0.02 -0.0085 0.05 -0.0145 0.19 
ΔMTA 0.0117 0.00 0.0117 0.00 0.0115 0.00 0.0123 0.00 0.0136 0.01 
ΔMI 0.0267 0.05 0.0129 0.40 0.0192 0.17 0.0154 0.29 -0.0284 0.45 
ST 0.0514 0.00 0.0537 0.00 0.0552 0.00 0.0545 0.00 0.0597 0.00 
AVST 0.0264 0.00 0.0266 0.00 0.0271 0.00 0.0277 0.00 0.0254 0.00 
MGT -0.0009 0.49 -0.0015 0.23 -0.0007 0.60 -0.0005 0.69 -0.0024 0.38 
DEC 0.1470 0.01 0.1346 0.01 0.1271 0.02 0.1078 0.04 0.1300 0.24 
INC 0.0628 0.00 0.0688 0.00 0.0628 0.00 0.0605 0.00 0.0681 0.07 
LEV 0.0207 0.00 0.0210 0.00 0.0203 0.00 0.0230 0.00 0.0409 0.00 
SIZE -0.0019 0.00 -0.0020 0.00 -0.0021 0.00 -0.0025 0.00 -0.0055 0.00 
SC -0.0027 0.12 -0.0019 0.31 -0.0032 0.09 -0.0019 0.24 0.0000 0.99 
SC×ΔSALE 0.0054 0.15 -0.0024 0.36 0.0120 0.02 0.0116 0.04 -0.0070 0.12 
SC×ΔOCF -0.0022 0.82 -0.0097 0.38 0.0057 0.56 -0.0165 0.12 0.0029 0.88 
SC×ΔMTA -0.0115 0.09 -0.0118 0.08 -0.0124 0.04 -0.0089 0.22 -0.0198 0.02 
SC×ΔMI -0.0854 0.06 -0.0122 0.74 -0.0785 0.07 -0.0658 0.21 0.0352 0.55 
SC×ST 0.0213 0.23 0.0022 0.89 -0.0065 0.62 -0.0164 0.29 -0.0233 0.37 
SC×AVST 0.0145 0.10 0.0134 0.18 0.0144 0.12 0.0059 0.51 -0.0031 0.83 
SC×MGT 0.0021 0.43 0.0070 0.02 -0.0005 0.84 -0.0055 0.10 0.0102 0.03 
SC×DEC -0.3045 0.00 -0.2086 0.12 -0.1981 0.06 -0.0956 0.39 -0.2429 0.13 
SC×INC 0.0863 0.16 0.0323 0.51 0.0983 0.15 0.0282 0.57 0.1479 0.06 
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Criteria 
of ABSA Number of 
clients
Total assets of 
clients
Audit fees
Local 
advantage 
VS
Local common
Joint venture 
advantage
VS
Local common
Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value
样本量 3853 3853 3853 3572 1046
Adj R2 0.4017 0.3949 0.4004 0.4003 0.4730
F值 58.46*** 56.87*** 58.17*** 53.96*** 21.84***
The model includes 18 industry dummies and 2 year dummies not listed for simplicity. All variables 
are as deﬁned in Table 2.
Table 8: ABSA Eﬀect in Group Regressions
Model Variables Criteria of
Classiﬁcation
Group Sample Coeﬃcient F test
Return WPSP
Number of 
clients
Advantage
Common
713
3140
0.61
0.11
7.51***
Total assets of 
clients
Advantage
Common
485
3368
1.09
0.11
31.16***
Audit fees Advantage
Common
589
3264
1.19
0.08
39.64***
Joint venture Advantage
Common
101
945
1.29
0.32
14.14***
Top 100 Advantage
Common
495
3077
0.89
0.10
19.06***
Price WPS
Number of 
clients
Advantage
Common
713
3140
0.61
0.11
7.51***
Total assets of 
clients
Advantage
Common
485
3368
1.09
0.11
31.16***
Audit fees Advantage
Common
589
3264
1.19
0.08
39.64***
Joint venture Advantage
Common
101
945
1.29
0.32
14.14***
Top 100 Advantage
Common
495
3077
0.89
0.10
19.06***
Persistence WITA
Number of 
clients
Advantage
Common
713
3140
0.37
0.20
16.27***
Total assets of 
clients
Advantage
Common
485
3368
0.54
0.20
79.77***
Audit fees Advantage
Common
589
3264
0.45
0.21
35.86***
Joint venture Advantage
Common
101
945
0.32
0.35
0.20
Top 100 Advantage
Common
495
3077
0.74
0.19
183.07***
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Model Variables Criteria of
Classiﬁcation
Group Sample Coeﬃcient F test
Determinants
ΔMTA Number of 
clients
Advantage
Common
713
3140
0.0013
0.0117
31.14***
Total assets of 
clients
Advantage
Common
485
3368
-0.0034
0.0121
70.16***
Audit fees Advantage
Common
589
3264
-0.0016
0.0117
49.54***
Joint venture Advantage
Common
101
945
-0.0181
0.0137
62.60***
Top 100 Advantage
Common
495
3077
0.0018
0.0124
29.08***
DEC Number of 
clients
Advantage
Common
713
3140
-0.1562
0.1471
197.76***
Total assets of 
clients
Advantage
Common
485
3368
-0.0393
0.1303
60.77***
Audit fees Advantage
Common
589
3264
-0.0705
0.1244
79.29***
Joint venture Advantage
Common
101
945
-0.0942
0.1274
21.19***
Top 100 Advantage
Common
495
3077
0.0168
0.1075
16.27***
All variables are as deﬁned in Table 2.
1. ABSA Eﬀect in Models of Information’s Usefulness
The results of Table 4 to Table 6 present four important ﬁndings. First, China’s 
listed ﬁrms report earnings with strong value relevance, since coeﬃcients of both 
operating income and non-operating income before write-downs are positive 
and signiﬁcant in the association models.14 Second, coeﬃcients of SC*WPSP are 
positively signiﬁcant in four of the ﬁve return models, which indicates that return 
relevance of write-downs rises as the audit business scale increases. Third, only 
two of the price models’ results are consistent with an ABSA effect. Therefore, 
each association between audit business scale and write-downs in price model is 
much weaker than that of the return model. Meanwhile, the persistence models’ 
performance is the same as the price models. Fourth, the relation between audit 
business scale and write-downs is weaker if we relax the selection criteria of the 
Advantage group. For example, we ﬁnd that an ABSA eﬀect remains in tests of 
Joint Venture Advantage only if we add a condition that bad debt impairment 
dominates the write-downs. This condition is based on research of Cai and Zhang 
14 P-value is lower than 10%, two tailed.
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(2004), that requires, a firm’s accounts receivable divided by total assets to be 
higher than the average level (median) of the industry, and also that the proportion 
of bad debt impairment to total write-downs is higher than 50%.15 We added 
group tests to take into account the possible multicollinearity and present results 
in Table 8. In return models, the multiple of write-downs in advantage group is 
higher than that of the common group, and the difference between advantage 
group and common group is obvious in price and persistence models. The results 
are consistent with our predictions.16
2. ABSA Eﬀect in Determinants of Asset Impairment
The usefulness of impairment information is related to two factors. The first 
is whether asset impairment is fairly estimated and audited by auditors with 
professional judgment. The second is whether report incentives are regulated by 
auditors with independent judgment. Table 7 shows whether audit business scale 
aﬀects the relation between impairment factors and write-downs. We found that 
both economic variables and report variables can explain asset impairment when 
SC is equal to 0. The result is consistent with prior researches (Francis et al 1996; 
Riedl 2004; Li 2001). We may have underestimated capture the explanatory 
power of economics factors, given that the variables cannot fully economic reality. 
We believe that China’s listed firms disclose valuable information about asset 
impairments. However, the limitation of modeling and empirical testing restricts 
the power of revealing this reality.
In terms of economic factors, SC enhances the association between WDTA and 
ΔMTA in most of the models, which indicates a weak ABSA eﬀect in auditors’ 
professional judgment. In terms of reporting incentive variables, we found that SC 
enhances the  association between WDTA and DEC. This suggests that auditors 
focus on ﬁrms with declining earnings. We also ﬁnd that results of other report 
variables are mixed. For example, when SC is idendiﬁed by number of clients, ST 
is positively related to WDTA. Therefore, the evidence in determinants of write-
downs is weak. Since some variables’ VIF values reached six, we employ a group 
test on ΔMTA and DEC to address the possible multicollinearity problem. The 
results in Table 8 reinforced our results in the interaction tests.
15 Since our models cannot fully catch advantages of the Big 4 auditors, we may 
underestimate the ABSA eﬀect of Big 4 CPA ﬁrms. That is to say, we cannot deny ABSA 
eﬀect in the Big 4 CPA ﬁrms because we know little about real advantages of the Big 4 
and our models cannot fully catch advantages of the Big 4 auditors.
16 Since we employ F test in group test without White-adjusted test, ABSA effect is 
observed only if both interaction tests and group tests are consistent with predictions.
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3. Additional Tests
Two additional tests are conducted in this section. First, we change the deﬁnitions 
of SC to test the general suitability and robustness of the ABSA eﬀect. We rank 
audit business scale into five groups and use group numbers as the research 
variable. We also use the raw data of audit business scale as the indicator of ABSA 
and results of return models are presented in Table 9. We ﬁnd that an ABSA eﬀect 
still exists in the return models. However, the results on other dimensions are 
mixed. 
Table 9: Additional Tests
Panel A: Ranking samples into ﬁve groups by audit business scale
Criteria of  
ABSA
Number of clients Total assets of clients Audit fees
Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value
Intercept -0.71 0.00 -0.71 0.00 -0.72 0.00 
FWPSP_O 2.97 0.00 2.97 0.00 2.98 0.00 
FWPSP_O 1.60 0.00 1.59 0.00 1.63 0.00 
WPSP 0.52 0.01 0.56 0.03 0.61 0.01 
SIZE 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 
SC 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.65 
SC*WPSP -0.33 0.02 -0.24 0.08 -0.33 0.01 
YEAR02 0.00 0.69 0.00 0.69 0.00 0.70 
YEAR03 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 
YEAR04 -0.20 0.00 -0.20 0.00 -0.20 0.00 
N 3853 3853 3853
Adj R2 0.3858 0.3850 0.3854
F value 269.80*** 268.98*** 269.41***
SC range from 0-4 and group 0 is the top group; all other variables are as deﬁned in Table 2.
Panel B: Using raw data of audit business scale as proxies for SC
Criterion of 
ABSA
Number of clients Total assets of clients Audit fees
Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value
Intercept -0.71 0.00 -0.80 0.00 -0.78 0.00 
FWPSP_O 2.98 0.00 2.98 0.00 2.99 0.00 
FWPSP_O 1.63 0.00 1.59 0.00 1.63 0.00 
WPSP -0.27 0.35 -6.83 0.00 -8.94 0.05 
SIZE 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 
SC 0.00 0.84 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.38 
SC*WPSP 0.02 0.03 0.46 0.00 0.57 0.00 
YEAR02 0.00 0.68 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.71 
YEAR03 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 
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Criterion of 
ABSA
Number of clients Total assets of clients Audit fees
Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value
YEAR04 -0.19 0.00 -0.20 0.00 -0.20 0.00 
N 3853 3853 3853
Adj R2 0.3852 0.3859 0.3856
F value 269.12*** 269.99*** 269.57***
SC equal to raw data of audit business scale, all other variables are as deﬁned in Table 2.
Second, we test which factors may contribute to an ABSA eﬀect. Alciatore et 
al (1998) suggests that researchers should explore the economic reality of write-
downs. That will help us understand the market reaction of write-downs events. 
Therefore, we search listed firms’ financial reports with key word “reason of 
impairment” and classify information of write-downs by assets.17 We find that 
listed ﬁrms explain why their cash ﬂow of assets decreases, which is consistent with 
asset impairment standards. In terms of bad debt impairment, ﬁrms focus on risks 
of receiving; in terms of ﬁxed assets, ﬁrms focus on whether the asset is vulnerable 
to technological change. Since both auditing and disclosure are beneﬁcial to the 
usefulness of information, we predict that ABSA eﬀect will be easier to observe 
if investors require more information about write-downs. To confirm such a 
prediction, we employed the following tests. First, we delete samples containing 
“reason of impairment” and retest the value relevance models. Second, we test 
ABSA eﬀect in the Top ﬁve write-down industries. Third, we test for an ABSA 
effect when bad debt impairments dominate write-downs.18 We present these 
results when SC is identiﬁed by number of clients in Table 10.
 Table 10
Panel A: Return model
Samples Deleting samples 
with “reason of 
impairment”
Top 5 industry by 
amount of  
write-downs
Bad debt 
impairment 
dominating
Deleting auditors 
processed mergers
Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value
截距 -0.78 0.00 -0.58 0.00 -1.03 0.00 -0.62 0.00 
FWPSP_O 3.07 0.00 3.15 0.00 2.51 0.00 3.21 0.00 
FWPSP_B 1.79 0.00 2.49 0.00 1.37 0.00 1.84 0.00 
WPSP -0.01 0.97 -0.21 0.42 0.35 0.09 0.43 0.12 
17 We heavily underestimate the samples with key word “reason of impairment” because 
firms could disclose information of write-downs by many kinds of key words besides 
“reason of impairment”.
18 In terms of Top 5 industries, the medians of write-downs divided by beginning total asset 
are higher than those of the other industries. 
ZIYE ZHAO & BIN ZHANG76
SIZE 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 
SC 0.02 0.18 0.00 0.90 0.01 0.53 0.01 0.29 
SC×WPSP 0.92 0.02 1.15 0.06 0.56 0.21 0.47 0.43 
YEAR02 0.00 0.66 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.59 
YEAR03 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.00 
YEAR04 -0.19 0.00 -0.20 0.00 -0.20 0.00 -0.19 0.00 
N 2942 1239 1225 2120
Adj R2 0.3918 0.3723 0.4168 0.3862
F value 211.55*** 82.59*** 98.19*** 132.97***
Panel B: Price model
Samples Deleting samples 
with “reason of 
impairment”
Top 5 industry by 
amount of  
write-downs
Bad debt 
impairment 
dominating
Deleting auditors 
processed mergers
Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value
စජ 34.61 0.00 36.04 0.00 23.25 0.00 34.87 0.00 
FWPS_O 6.68 0.00 7.08 0.00 6.91 0.00 6.73 0.00 
FWPS_B 4.85 0.00 6.35 0.00 3.63 0.00 5.16 0.00 
BVPS 0.59 0.00 0.69 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.74 0.00 
WPS -2.40 0.00 -2.55 0.00 -1.61 0.00 -2.26 0.00 
SIZE -1.24 0.00 -1.28 0.00 -0.69 0.00 -1.27 0.00 
SC 0.68 0.00 0.53 0.03 0.75 0.00 0.42 0.01 
SC×WPS 3.04 0.00 1.87 0.12 1.96 0.05 1.01 0.37 
YEAR02 -2.55 0.00 -2.76 0.00 -2.02 0.00 -2.50 0.00 
YEAR03 -3.74 0.00 -4.00 0.00 -3.25 0.00 -3.46 0.00 
YEAR04 -6.92 0.00 -7.61 0.00 -6.24 0.00 -6.81 0.00 
N 2942 1239 1225 2120
Adj R2 0.5751 0.5885 0.5210 0.5839
F value 399.12*** 178.03*** 134.13*** 265.92***
Panel B: Persistence model
Samples Deleting samples 
with “reason of 
impairment”
Top 5 industry by 
amount of  
write-downs
Bad debt 
impairment 
dominating
Deleting auditors 
processed mergers
Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value
截距 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.06 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 
OITA 0.81 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.85 0.00 0.79 0.00 
BITA 0.45 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.48 0.00 
WITA 0.12 0.19 0.11 0.43 0.37 0.00 0.04 0.75 
SC 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.76 0.01 0.14 0.00 0.31 
SC*WITA 0.25 0.29 0.19 0.56 -0.03 0.93 0.48 0.09 
YEAR02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.32 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 
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YEAR03 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.68 0.00 0.89 0.01 0.03 
YEAR04 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.19 -0.01 0.04 
N 2942 1239 1225 2120
Adj R2 0.3599 0.2901 0.3576 0.3498
F value 207.70*** 64.24*** 86.16*** 127.96***
All variables are as deﬁned in Table 2.
We found that the results of SC×WPSP are the same as those with full samples. 
However, the ABSA effect in price models is stronger than models with total 
samples. 
Finally, we test whether the trajectory of audit business scale advantage aﬀects 
ABSA effect. We deleted auditors merging in 1997-1999 and we find that the 
results are mixed19. Therefore, we cannot make any deﬁnite conclusion based on 
this test.
4. Sensitivity Tests
For the robustness check, we conducted the following sensitivity tests. First, 
we identiﬁed audit business scale advantage by research period instead of single 
year, and observed that results are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. Second, we delete 
observations with modiﬁed opinions for 2001 and retest for an ABSA eﬀect. We 
deleted these samples because firms with modified opinions may be different 
from other ﬁrms regarding their ﬁnancial status. 2001 is the beginning year of the 
requirement of long lived asset’ write-downs. The results are shown in Table 11.
Table 11: Sensitivity Tests
Model Interaction 
item
Criterion of  
ABSA
SC’s 
deﬁnition
Sample Coeﬃcient
(p-value)
Return SC*WPSP
Number of 
clients
Top 5
5 groups
Raw data
2861 1.03(0.16)
-0.48(0.03)
0.02(0.43)
Total assets of 
clients
Top 5
5 groups
Raw data
2861 3.05(0.04)
-0.34(0.09)
0.74(0.02)
Audit fees Top 5
5 groups
Raw data
2861 1.53(0.16)
-0.25(0.22)
0.65(0.12)
19 The data of mergers is from the appendix 2 of ēWho audits China’s Audit Market? 
(Analysis of audit market in 2000)Ĕ,  Chief Accountant Office, China Securities 
Regulatory Commission, Beijing, Chinese Financial and Economics Publications.
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Model Interaction 
item
Criterion of  
ABSA
SC’s 
deﬁnition
Sample Coeﬃcient
(p-value)
Price SC*WPS
Number of 
clients
Top 5
5 groups
Raw data
2861 0.40(0.75)
-0.63(0.28)
0.01(0.77)
Total assets of 
clients
Top 5
5 groups
Raw data
2861 3.01(0.15)
0.35(0.38)
0.21(0.76)
Audit fees Top 5
5 groups
Raw data
2861 0.23(0.87)
0.12(0.77)
0.18(0.81)
Persistence SC*WITA
Number of 
clients
Top 5
5 groups
Raw data
2861 0.45(0.18)
-0.21(0.03)
0.02(0.04)
Total assets of 
clients
Top 5
5 groups
Raw data
2861 0.38(0.17)
-0.18(0.03)
0.23(0.02)
Audit fees Top 5
5 groups
Raw data
2861 0.25(0.38)
-0.21(0.03)
0.30(0.05)
All variables are as deﬁned in Table 2.
After deleting unwanted observations from our sample, we found that 
ABSA effect is weaker in the return model with audit fees but is stronger in 
the persistence models. The results do not show there is no ABSA eﬀect on the 
contrary, when taken together, we ﬁnd some evidence of an ABSA eﬀect, though 
our models do not fully capture economic reality. However, all tested dimensions 
are partly consistent with our predictions. While the results for three dimensions 
varied, We believe that is disparity is attributable to the divergence of investors’ 
understanding of write-downs, modeling limitations in capturing real motivations, 
incentives and other economic factors. The disparity in the statistical results should 
not aﬀect the conclusion on regarding ABSA. Tentatively, we make the inference 
that the ABSA eﬀect exists with some limitations, and the magnitude of the scale 
advantage varies with the model design and variable deﬁnitions. 
Conclusions
The evolvtion of China’s auditing gives us an opportunity to gather data to test 
for an ABSA eﬀect. More speciﬁcally, we investigated whether the scale of audit 
business is positively related to audit quality. By examining the audit of asset write-
downs, we found that the quality of this task was positively related to the scale of 
the auditors business. Despite a wear association in some tests, we conclude that 
the quality of write-down judgements made by larger scale auditors was better 
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received, and an ABSA eﬀect exists in China’s audit market. 
After conﬁrming that an ABSA eﬀect is found on some dimensions of audit 
quality of asset write-downs, we asked two questions. First, what is the wealth 
eﬀect of all stakeholders in the audit market? It seems that clients beneﬁt if they 
use audit business scale as an indicator of audit quality given that it is costly to 
observe audit quality. This research investigates whether audit business scale is 
appropriate proxy for audit quality. We do not claim that larger audit ﬁrms are 
always better. How market perceives audit quality with information asymmetry is 
still an open research question. 
Second, what are the real forces undermine the ABSA eﬀect in China’s audit 
market? This paper looked at the cooperative constructions process participated by 
stakeholders in China audit market, and factored in the enhancement of business 
liquidity and competition under the guidance of audit market policy. Quasi-
rent eﬀects of cooperative regulation and the establishment of civil litigation and 
compensation system were considerate also. Nevertheless, this paper is exploratory 
analysis of the issue and further research on this topic is recommended.
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